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ABSTRACT 
 
Throughout the world, the sons and daughters of many state leaders attract media attention 
for their exploits. Like other famous children of politicians, Isabel dos Santos, the daughter 
of José Eduardo dos Santos, the former president of Angola (1979-2017), is the object of 
much media scrutiny regarding her investments and lavish spending habits. We rely on a 
systematic study of newspaper articles by Angolan and international media, readers’ 
comments, social media and websites to examine the conflicting portrayals of Isabel from 
2010 to 2018. This period covers celebratory depictions of Isabel during the growth of her 
business empire to her dismissal as head of Sonangol after her father left the presidency. 
We argue that the change in portrayals of Isabel over time offers insight into the dimensions 
of dynastic politics in authoritarian settings. Whereas her position as wealthy presidential 
daughter ironically reinforced patriarchal political oligarchy, her downfall demonstrates 
the limits of hereditary politics in Angola. 
 
Keywords: Angola, West Africa, Isabel dos Santos, dynasties, feminism, gender, media, 
political economy, politics, wealth.  
 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
Dans le monde entier, les fils et les filles de nombreux chefs d’État attirent l’attention des 
médias pour leurs exploits. Comme d’autres enfants célèbres de politiciens, Isabel dos 
Santos, fille de José Eduardo dos Santos, ancien président de l’Angola (1979-2017), fait 
l’objet d’un examen approfondi de la part des médias au sujet de ses investissements et de 
ses habitudes de dépense fastueuses. Nous réalisions une étude systématique d’articles de 
journaux des médias angolais et internationaux, de commentaires sur les réseaux sociaux 
et des sites web pour examiner les représentations contradictoires d’Isabel de 2010 à 2018. 
Cette période contemple les représentations célébrant Isabel pendant la croissance de son 
entreprise, allant de son licenciement à la tête de Sonangol et après le départ de son père 
de la présidence. Nous soutenons que le changement de portrait d’Isabel au fil du temps 
offre une idée des dimensions de la politique dynastique dans des contextes autoritaires. 
Alors que sa position en tant que fille présidentielle aisée renforce de manière ironique 
l’oligarchie politique patriarcale, sa chute témoigne des limites de la politique héréditaire 
en Angola. 
 
Mots clé : Angola, Afrique occidentale, Isabel dos Santos, dynasties, économie politique, 
feminisme, genre, médias, politique, richesses.  
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Isabel dos Santos is the daughter of José Eduardo dos Santos, the former President of 
Angola who served from 1979 to 2017. With an estimated net worth of about 2.2 billion 
US dollars in 2018, she is often portrayed by the global and national media as an “African 
princess” whose wealth derives from her connection to her father rather than to any 
business acumen (Dolan & Marques de Morais 2013, Smith 2013). Over the course of her 
45 years of life, she has acquired business interests in banking, oil, real estate and the 
media, not only in Angola but also in Portugal, the former colonial power, and in the 
Netherlands (Fernandes 2015). Before being dismissed in 2017 from her position by the 
current president of Angola, João Lourenço, Isabel dos Santos also served as chairwoman 
of Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola—Sonangol, Angola’s national oil 
company. Oil sales are the country’s main source of revenue (Ennes Ferreira & Soares de 
Oliveira 2018).  
 All over the world, the sons and daughters of many state leaders frequently attract 
media attention for their exploits. Donald Trump Jr., the son of President Trump, has 
received relentless media coverage for allegedly lying to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the United States Congress about a meeting with Russian officials 
close to President Putin. On the African continent, Nyimpine Chissano, the eldest (now 
deceased), son of former President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, was believed to 
have been involved in the murders of a journalist and a banker who were investigating acts 
of corruption involving high-ranking officials of the ruling Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique (Frelimo). The current President of Gabon, Ali Bongo Odimba, is the son of 
Omar Bongo who governed Gabon for 42 years until 2009. Like his father, he is considered 
the richest man in Gabon owing to the revenue he receives from the country’s oil 
production. Among his assets are luxury properties in France and expensive sports cars.  
 Like these other famous children of politicians, Isabel dos Santos is the object of 
much media attention regarding her investments or her lavish spending habits. Yet, 
portrayals of Isabel dos Santos reflect contradictory, gendered and temporal modalities that 
characterize the coverage of dynastic politics in Angola. First, building on insights by 
Amina Mama (1995: 41), we argue that Isabel is the ultimate “femocrat”: because her 
prominence and authority derive from her connection to her father, she is complicit in 
maintaining the largely “patriarchal status quo” in Angola. Media coverage of Isabel 
exposes this “femocracy” in two conflicting ways. On the one hand, when Isabel’s father 
was president, the mainstream media in Angola celebrated her entrepreneurial spirit, her 
modernism, and her cosmopolitanism—as might be expected of a media mostly controlled 
by the state. In so doing, their depictions served to legitimate the accumulation of political 
power and wealth by a “patriarchal oligarchy” (Mama 1995: 41) centered around the 
Presidency (Soares de Oliveira 2015: 40-47). They also aimed to validate the importance 
of family connections, which are said to be ubiquitous or essential in Angola (Schubert 
2017).  
 On the other hand, for many critics, Isabel is emblematic of the entrenched 
authoritarianism and savage capitalism that characterizes post-war, post-socialist Angola, 
and of the role played by race, ethnicity and status divisions in party politics. Being mixed-
raced or mestiço, Isabel belongs to a privileged group within Angolan politics and society 
and, for that reason, she is an easy target for criticism emanating from within the regime’s 
inner circle and from the opposition. Inside the ruling party, the Movimento Popular de 
Libertação de Angola (MPLA), complaints that the mestiços have more power than any other 
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group resurface from time to time (Soares de Oliveira 2015). Moreover, the main 
opposition party, Unita (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola), perceives 
the MPLA as a party that mainly represents the interests of the mestiços rather than of the 
“authentic” Angolan (Pearce 2017).  
 More critical national journalists and the foreign press, in particular, have 
frequently accused Isabel of flagrant abuse of power and money. They allege often that her 
wealth and prestige were made possible by her father and, occasionally, they also reference 
her race or her racial preferences to condemn her actions.1 In addition, her frequent displays 
of conspicuous consumption in a country known for high levels of inequality and 
widespread impoverishment generate outrage among selected national and foreign 
journalists, their readers and members of the public. Since her father stepped down from 
power, these accusations have intensified. She is now the subject of a government inquiry 
regarding possible acts of graft that she committed as former head of Sonangol (Agência 
Lusa 2018). 
  Second, the change in portrayals of Isabel over time especially by the national 
media offers insight into the excesses and limits of dynastic politics in authoritarian 
settings. Whereas the state controlled media once praised Isabel’s successes and offered 
stylized snapshots of her glamorous lifestyle, they now produce measured reports of her 
transgressions, often linking them to a larger state project by the new Angolan President to 
eliminate corruption. In charting her rise and fall over time, we reveal the means by which 
authoritarian regimes periodically reproduce and cleanse themselves. 
 Finally, unlike the stereotypical critiques of corrupt African “big men,” we argue 
that the tone and the frequency of negative portrayals of Isabel are rooted in a deep seated 
misogyny towards women, especially African women who display an interest in business.2 
References to Isabel as an “African princess” or a “Daddy’s girl” are indicative of the more 
dismissive caricatures of her by the media (e.g. Smith 2013; Eisenhammer et al. 2017). 
Insofar as these critiques of Isabel reference her gender and her family connections, they 
paradoxically project a subordinate role for women in African society. Moreover, whereas 
the singular position of Isabel as wealthy, presidential daughter ironically reinforced the 
patriarchal political oligarchy, her downfall demonstrates the limits of hereditary politics 
in Angola. 
                                                        
1 For instance, the issue gained visibility when after being fired from Sonangol, she reacted 
to criticism that her administration privileged foreigners instead of Angolan entrepreneurs. 
Here is a fragment of her response: “Military personnel, from soldiers to generals, whites 
and mestiços, gave their lives and many died in order for us to achieve peace. I think racism 
is unacceptable! To accept that someone is hired for Sonangol based on the color of his/her 
skin is wrong. People should be hired on their merit” 
(<https://sol.sapo.pt/artigo/603923/isabel-dos-santos-e-obvio-que-sou-uma-gestora-
capaz-e-competente>). 
2  Valentina Guebuza, the deceased daughter of former President Guebuza of Mozambique was treated 
similarly. In 2013, she was also on Forbes’ list of the 20 most powerful women in Africa which was headed 
by Isabel (<https://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2013/12/04/the-20-young-power-women-in-
africa-2013/#31d93ad65431>). See also the inclusion of her as one of the three most wealthy “African 
princesses”: 
<https://www.elmundo.es/blogs/elmundo/billonarios/2015/07/08/tres-princesas-africanas.html>. 
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 Content analysis of newspaper and magazine articles about Isabel from the state 
and private media in Angola, Angolan blogs, and articles in the foreign press (particularly 
in Portugal) from 2010 to 2018 serve as the basis for our claims. Our argument also draws 
on posts from Isabel on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram as well as comments by readers 
to newspaper articles or on social media. Below, we present a short biography of Isabel 
dos Santos and situate her professional life within the context of post-socialist, post-war 
Angola. We then examine the ways in which the media presents contrasting images of 
Isabel and how she attempts to brand herself through the use of social media. We explore 
the reasons for the juxtaposition of flattery by the state media with the condemnation of 
her family linkages and business practices by independent national critics and the foreign 
media while her father was president. We also explain the shift over time in domestic 
depictions as the dos Santos family fell from grace. We end this section by examining the 
misogynistic attitudes about Isabel reflected in print and on social media. Finally, we 
conclude the article with some broader reflections on the paradox of Isabel's portrayals by 
the media.  
 
 
Understanding Isabel 
 
Isabel is the eldest daughter of José Eduardo dos Santos (JES), Angola’s second and longest-
serving president, who stepped down in 2017 after 38 years in power. She is his daughter 
from his first marriage to a Russian woman, Tatiana Kukanova. She was born in 1973 in 
Baku, Azerbaijan where her father studied in the 1970s. Her father was a member of the 
MPLA, one of several anti-colonial movements fighting against the Portuguese in Angola 
from the 1960s until the early 1970s. Following the overthrow of the Portuguese 
dictatorship in April 1974, the MPLA extended its power in Angola and has been the only 
ruling party since independence was declared in November 1975. After the first president 
of independent Angola, Agostinho Neto, died of cancer, Isabel’s father acceded to the 
presidency and occupied that position continuously until 2017. He and his party oversaw 
—and survived—a long and failed experiment with socialism, a 27-year civil war, and 
now, a kind of state capitalism based on the exploitation of Angola’s vast offshore oil 
wealth.  
 The “poster child for Angola’s oligarchic decade, Isabel is amongst its richest, and 
the person whose lifestyle and aspirations strive for global respectability” (Soares de 
Oliveira 2014: 151-152). She has been commonly depicted as the “princess” of Angola, 
and although Ana Paula dos Santos, the former president’s spouse, was the official first 
lady, Isabel is often the one in the headlines. She is the face of the family’s business empire 
and therefore epitomizes the capitalist ethos of the regime. 
 Isabel does not fit the conventional expectation of how women who are related to 
powerful politicians behave in Africa, which is to be apolitical, feminine and charitable, 
nor does she have a special relationship with “the masses” as has been said of Chantal Biya 
and other first ladies (Eboko 2004; Messiant & Marchal 2004). Although she was president 
of the Angolan Red Cross for twelve years (2006-2018), and was involved in some social 
work via her businesses, she was never considered a particularly charitable person who 
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was loved by the people.3 Furthermore, until recently, she was not strongly committed to 
women’s empowerment issues, even though she occasionally referred to the challenges of 
being a businesswoman in Africa (Burgis 2013). Instead, Isabel has mainly sought to 
portray herself as a competent, hardworking self-made woman whose wealth and success 
are independent from her family fortune.4 When Forbes magazine declared her Africa’s 
richest woman in 2013 (with a net worth of 3 billion US dollars) Isabel was quoted as 
saying:  
 
I’ve had business sense since I was very young. I sold chicken eggs when I was six. […] I work all the time. 
Seven days a week. […] I think there’s lots of people with family connections but who are actually nowhere. 
If you’re hard-working and determined, you will make it and that’s the bottom line. I don’t believe in an easy 
way through (Burgis 2013).  
 
Isabel’s career trajectory has been unusual for first daughters. She was educated at 
St Paul’s School for Girls, and received an engineering degree at King’s College London. 
Her first business ventures when she returned to Angola were a restaurant on the beach in 
Luanda (the capital) and a rubbish-collection business (Soares de Oliveira 2015: 152). As 
much as she attributes her success to her hard work, Isabel has been a prominent and major 
beneficiary of the massive profit from oil and other resources siphoned off by the Angolan 
elite and, particularly, by her father. Sonangol (the state-owned oil company), and other 
prominent Angolan elites, such as generals Leopoldino do Nascimento and Manuel Vieira 
Dias (otherwise known as Kopelipa), were shareholders in Isabel’s first major business, 
Unitel. Founded in 2001, Unitel is a telecommunications company that became the 
country’s first private mobile phone operator following privatization of the state-owned 
company (Fernandes 2015; Visão 2017). The creation of Unitel (sarcastically referred to as 
“Isatel”) was announced by presidential decree rather than established through a 
competitive public bidding process. Furthermore, the president continued to play a crucial 
role in the “making of Isabel.” He awarded her major national projects including the 
Metropolitan General Master Plan for Luanda and the Commission for Oil Sector Reform 
(Gaspar 2016). 
As Angola shifted from a state-driven economy to a more “statist market economy” 
during the 1990s and 2000s (Pitcher 2017), Isabel benefitted from the privatization of other 
parastatals and privileged access to major investors. Besides investments in Angola’s 
telecommunications company, she is involved in diamond mining, retail trade, cement 
factories, banking and private health clinics in Luanda. During the global financial crisis 
of 2009, she relied on holding companies to acquire shares in the real estate, energy, multi-
media, and financial sectors primarily in Portugal but also in the Netherlands (Siun, 
                                                        
3 For instance, she was highly criticized when she used her Instagram to ask people to make donations to the 
Pediatric Hospital David Bernardino. One follower stated ironically: “If only there was one millionaire who 
read this request (…)” (<http://www.redeangola.info/isabel-dos-santos-pede-doacoes-para-hospital-
pediatrico/>). Her activity in the Red Cross often consisted of extravagant fundraising galas she organized 
(attended by famous singers like Mariah Carey, John Legend and Craig David) that made little social impact. 
Nor was it clear whether the money raised was applied to the intended cause 
(<https://www.makaangola.org/2018/03/mestra-da-gestao-as-aventuras-de-isabel-dos-santos-na-cruz-
vermelha/>). Articles accessed on October 23, 2018.  
4 In 2017, José Eduardo dos Santos, was the richest president in Africa with a net worth of US$20 billion 
(Sunday Independent, October 8 2017, <https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/the-sunday-
independent/20171008/281852938783333>). 
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Akinyoade, et al. 2017; Table 1). Her many assets earned her the title of “Queen of Africa 
and Empress of Portugal” from a Spanish-language newspaper (Del Barrio 2014).  
 In addition to her investments, she was formerly CEO of Sonangol, which 
contributes 95% of the value of the country’s exports (Eisenhammer 2018). Founded in 
1976, Sonangol’s revenue from oil has enabled it to make major investments abroad and it 
has stakes in most of the dos Santos family businesses. During the initial years of 
independence, the company escaped the “predatory and centrally planned logic of Angola’s 
political economy” (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 595), but it has been a lynchpin of Angola’s 
shift to crony capitalism since the 1990s. Despite the company’s apparent sophistication, 
the wealth generated by Sonangol largely served the interests of the president and his 
closest allies (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 606).  
The decision by JES to make Isabel the new CEO of Sonangol in 2016 was highly 
controversial. Charges of nepotism and favoritism came from all quarters—including 
former ministers, lawyers, intellectuals, and rappers (Novo Jornal de Angola 2016). A 
group of 12 Angolan lawyers even filed a motion alleging violation of the Public Probity 
Law. The Supreme Court’s failure to hear the motion eventually led to a call for protest, 
but the Luanda Provincial Governor prohibited it using a flimsy excuse that another 
demonstration was taking place at the same location and time (Agência Lusa 2016). Isabel 
eventually assumed the post.  
  
 
 
Table 1—The Assets of Isabel dos Santos in Angola and Portugal (2016-2017) 
Angola  
 
Portugal  
 
UNITEL (25%)2 
BFA—Banco Fomento de Angola (51%)1  
BIC—Banco Internacional de Crédito Angola 
(42,5%)1 
ZAP (70%)2  
CONTIDIS (100%)3  
CIMINVEST / NOVA CIMANGOLA4  
SODIBA3 
IMOLUANDA, S.A. (35%)7 
NOS—formerly Zon multimedia 
(52,14%)2 
BIC—Banco Internacional de Crédito 
Portugal (42,5%)1 
GALP (33,34%)5 
Efacec Power Solutions (72,62%) 
Millennium BCP (14,87%)1 
Santoro Financial Holdings, SGPS 
(100%)6 
Upstar Comunicações (70%)2 
Amorim Energia (18%)5 
Notes: 1Banking, 2 Communication; 3 Retail trade, 4Cement, 5Oil, 6 Personal holding, Real Estate7.  
This is not an exhaustive list.  
Sources: Costa, Lopes & Louçã (2013) and Visão (2016, 2017).  
 
Although Isabel is the most well-known member of the dos Santos clan, all of the 
former president’s ten children seem to have benefited from their father’s fortune, either 
through patronage (lucrative public procurement contracts) or through directorships of 
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state institutions and parastatals (Fernandes 2015: 36; Bruno 2017; Visão 2018). Isabel’s 
half-brother, José Filomeno dos Santos (Zénu), has also attracted a considerable amount of 
media attention (Fernandes 2015, Visão 2018). His first business was an investment bank 
(Banco Kwanza Invest) and between 2013-2018 he presided over the Sovereign Wealth 
Fund (Fundo Soberano de Angola—FSDEA). Contrary to Isabel, who has not gotten 
formally involved in politics, José Filomeno dos Santos became and has remained a 
member of the MPLA central committee since 2016 (Expresso 2016). Another half-sister, 
Welwitschia dos Santos (Tchizé)5, has stakes in the diamond sector (Di Oro company), and 
financial interests in the print media and advertising. She is also a member of parliament 
(elected in 2017) and of the MPLA central committee (elected 2016).  
To a lesser extent than these three children, the seven additional children of JES 
have also managed to increase their personal wealth by benefiting from public contracts 
and garnering stakes in banking and telecommunications (Fernandes 2015; Bruno 2017; 
Visão 2018). The media rarely mentions the internal dynamics of the Dos Santos family, 
but available evidence suggests that there is animosity amongst its members regarding how 
the wealth generated by the family businesses should be shared (Club K 2016; Agência 
Lusa 2019, Fernandes 2015: 34-36). Several times, Isabel has denied accusations that her 
father favors her, but the nature, extent and speed of her acquisitions suggest otherwise  
Finally, as long as JES was president of Angola, the members of the Dos Santos 
family (and their protégés) were considered to be “untouchable”; there were few limits to 
wealth accumulation and they seemed to be above the law. But this changed once João 
Lourenço replaced JES as president and MPLA party leader (Visão 2018). Sticking to his 
campaign promises to fight favoritism, corruption and nepotism in Angola, President 
Lourenço dismissed Isabel as CEO of Sonangol in 2017, Welwitschia as CEO of Angola’s 
Public Television (TPA) (also in 2017) and José Filomeno as president of FSDEA in 2018. 
The subsequent investigation of their management of these organizations—which has so 
far resulted in the detention of José Filomeno on charges of fraud—suggests that the family 
is no longer “untouchable” (New Vision 2015; Visão 2018). It also speaks to the limits of 
wealth accumulation and reproduction in an authoritarian, statist market economy. Below, 
we examine portrayals of Isabel by the media and highlight her own efforts at image 
making. We then offer an explanation for the differing depictions of Isabel by domestic 
and foreign media outlets and the change in her image over time. 
 
 
Isabel dos Santos’ Presence in the Media: The Rise and Fall of the Angolan “Princess” 
 
Despite the reticence of the Dos Santos family to occupy the media spotlight, Isabel’s 
presence on social, print and broadcasting media has increased substantially since 2010. 
Projecting Isabel dos Santos as a positive example of African entrepreneurship, the state-
owned newspaper Jornal de Angola awarded her the title of “Entrepreneur of the Year” in 
2012 when her father was still president (Domingos 2013). The South Africa-based, 
African Business Review followed by declaring her the top African woman entrepreneur in 
2014 (Africa Monitor 2014). Other accolades have followed. 
 Until her father stepped down in 2017, extensive official censorship of the media 
and the fascination of the Angolan elite with ostentatious displays of wealth meant that 
                                                        
5 From José Eduardo dos Santos’ relationship with Maria Luísa Abrantes. 
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most portrayals of Isabel dos Santos in Angolan popular culture were laudatory and 
sycophantic. They reinforced a public narrative regarding female empowerment and the 
socialist new woman that was articulated by the MPLA after independence, via the 
Organização da Mulher Angolana (OMA). OMA is the women’s wing of the MPLA and the 
party’s largest organization. It played an historical role in terms of mobilizing and 
defending women’s interests (Liberato 2016), but it has lost its strength over time (Tripp 
2015: 119) in tandem with the drift away from socialism. Even as the civil war raged in the 
1990s, the president and the party shifted towards a more market driven economy. The 
speed of this shift accelerated after the end of civil conflict in 2002. As some form of 
socialism gave way to state capitalism, articles extolled Isabel’s “entrepreneurial instinct” 
and her business acumen.  
 To better illustrate our claims regarding media depictions of Isabel, we performed 
a content analysis of online national media to demonstrate the frequency and tone of the 
portrayals of Isabel. We looked at all articles that mentioned “Isabel dos Santos” on the 
website of Agência Angola Press6 (ANGOP), between 2010 and 2018, and classified these 
as either “positive” or “negative” portrayals of Isabel7. This time frame allowed us to 
observe the nature of media coverage: 1) before Forbes ranked Isabel as Africa’s richest 
woman in 2013; 2) when Isabel was at the peak of her visibility and prestige (as Sonangol 
CEO in 2016); and 3) after the presidency transferred from JES to João Lourenço in 2017. 
This latter period coincided with the “downfall,” not only of Isabel but of other members 
of the Dos Santos clan and their protégés. The analysis is not exhaustive, but it does provide 
a valuable assessment of Isabel’s media profile. We also searched the website of Jornal de 
Angola for editorials written after the election of João Lourenço as these chronicle a shift 
in domestic media coverage.8  Finally, we highlight a sample of articles that exemplify the 
misogynistic representation of Isabel by the international media, as they focus on how the 
Portuguese media depicted Isabel and her business ventures.  
 Figures 1 and 2 show the frequency and tone of Isabel’s media coverage; we can 
see different trends before and after 2016. Until 2016, only a few ANGOP articles mentioned 
“Isabel dos Santos.” These mainly referred to her work in the Red Cross, her leadership of 
the Metropolitan General Master Plan for Luanda, and her distinction as one of “Angola’s 
Divas”9.  In 2016, the number of mentions of “Isabel dos Santos” increased considerably 
and the majority had to do with her work as the new CEO of Sonangol. The general tone of 
the articles was overwhelmingly positive. The domestic articles promote the image of a 
successful entrepreneur who competently manages her businesses in energy, 
communications, and finance and at the same time oversees Luanda’s urban revitalization. 
                                                        
6ANGOP is the government news agency: 
<http://www.angop.ao/angola/en_us/portal/informacoes/angop/sobre-a-angop/2013/4/21/The-
Agency,b6a60f15-0e0d-42cf-918a-310ae7438060.html>.  
7 Articles that give attention to Isabel’s work as entrepreneur are coded as positive. These include portrayals 
of her closing deals, attending important meetings or inaugurations, developing social work, reaching out to 
international partners. Articles coded as negative refer to: bad management, her dismissal from Sonangol and 
the Red Cross, accusations of alleged corruption, disagreements between Isabel and João Lourenço and 
assorted criticisms of her. 
8 <http://jornaldeangola.sapo.ao/>. A longer and more comprehensive search of articles from Jornal de 
Angola was not possible owing to flaws in the journal’s search engine.  
9  See <http://www.angop.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/lazer-e-cultura/2013/10/47/Distinguidas-Divas-Angola-
edicao-2013,60ce1c19-8139-4ea2-9ee5-b5f789ac44f6.html>. 
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Some examples of the tone of these positive articles are the following: “Isabel dos Santos’ 
Nomination [to Sonangol] is Appropriate” 10; “Isabel dos Santos sets the First Stone for the 
Construction of a Female Boarding School”11; “Metropolitan General Master Plan for 
Luanda Receives Award in London” 12; “Unitel Wants to Expand Business in the SADC 
Region” 13. 
 Negative portrayals of Isabel begin to emerge in 2016 in the state owned media, 
increase throughout 2017 and become dominant in 2018 (see Figure 2). Isabel’s dismissal 
from Sonangol owing to accusations of mismanagement, the end of her mandate as 
president of Red Cross amidst complaints by its workers, and the crisis in her jewelry 
business are among the issues that contribute to the negative portrayals of Isabel. The 
headlines that exemplify this are: “Isabel dos Santos Jewelry in Switzerland Enters Crisis” 
14; “Isabel Dos Santos Ignores Attorney General’s Office Notification”; 15  “Isabel dos 
Santos Denies Accusations of Mismanagement”;16 “Isabel dos Santos’ Company Defies 
the Angolan State.” 17 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. — NUMBER OF ARTICLES IN STATE OWNED MEDIA MENTIONING  
“ISABEL DOS SANTOS” BETWEEN 2010-2018. 
 
                                                        
10 English translations of Portuguese media quotes are the authors. “Angola: Nomeação de Isabel dos Santos 
é acertada,” June 5, 2016.  
<http://www.angop.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/politica/2016/5/22/Angola-Nomeacao-Isabel-dos-Santos-
acertada-Analista,67a4b113-0429-49a6-8713-a4ff6145176d.html>.  
11 “Isabel dos Santos lança pedra para construção de internato feminino,” November 25, 2016. 
<http://www.angop.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/sociedade/2016/10/47/Moxico-Isabel-dos-Santos-lanca-pedra-
para-construcao-internato-feminino,4c211bd5-3fb9-4d60-848a-b9068764b6df.html>.   
12 “Plano Director-Geral de Luanda é premiado em Londres,” April 14, 2016. 
<http://www.angop.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/economia/2016/3/15/Angola-Plano-Director-Geral-Luanda-
premiado-Londres,0dc52633-6aaa-4add-9a8f-11342ad29f25.html>. 
13 “Unitel quer expandir negócio na região da SADC,” March 13, 2015.  
<http://www.angop.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/economia/2015/2/11/Angola-Unitel-quer-expandir-negocio-
regiao-SADC,cf4e8155-98e1-4d50-a0e9-cfd00f333c02.html>.  
14  “Joalharia de Isabel dos Santos entra em crise na Suíça,” April 12, 2018. 
<http://www.angop.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/economia/2018/3/15/Joalharia-Isabel-dos-Santos-entra-crise-
Suica,445baa68-e335-49c0-a8c5-16e523093a14.html>.  
15  “Isabel dos Santos ignora notificação da procuradoria,” July 30, 2018. 
<http://www.angop.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/politica/2018/6/31/Isabel-dos-Santos-ignora-notificacao-
procuradoria,04285691-80d0-404c-8879-4f253d49ba2d.html>. 
16 “Isabel dos Santos nega acusações de má gestão,” March 5, 2018. 
<http://www.angop.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/economia/2018/2/10/Isabel-dos-Santos-nega-acusacoes-
gestao,aed03043-6327-4be4-affa-e8460776b8fb.html>. 
17 “Angola: Empresa de Isabel dos Santos desafia Estado angolano”, July 16 2018. 
<http://www.angop.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/politica/2018/6/29/Angola-Empresa-Isabel-dos-Santos-
desafia-Estado-angolano,9ea8448f-e145-4c58-af20-56b568fdd232.html>. 
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Note: 89 articles mentioned “Isabel dos Santos.” Search made between 23-24 October 2018.  
Source: Authors’ content analysis of the articles published on the Agência Angola Press website 
(<http://www.angop.ao/angola/en_us/index.html>). 
 
FIGURE 2. — TONE OF ARTICLES IN STATE OWNED MEDIA MENTIONING  
“ISABEL DOS SANTOS” BETWEEN 2010-2018 
 
 
Note: 89 articles mentioned “Isabel dos Santos”. Search made between 23-24 October 2018. 
Source: Authors’ content analysis of the articles published in the website of Agência Angola Press 
(<http://www.angop.ao/angola/en_us/index.html>). 
 
 In many articles by foreign journalists, we find a more acute form of criticism that 
predates her fall and more consistently questions her competence, highlights her family 
connections, and interrogates the legality, legitimacy and fairness of her wealth 
accumulation. A number of titles are illustrative. One article in Forbes (Dolan & Marques 
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in a Country Living on $2 a Day” and another, in Reuters (Eisenhammer et al. 2017), was 
called “How the ‘Princess’ of Angola Lost her Oil Crown” Rafael Marques de Morais 
(2012, 2016, 2018), the most well-known domestic critic of the Dos Santos family, adopts 
similar critical stances, either through his blog Maka Angola, or through the international 
press, which often republishes his blog posts.  
For example, the South African Press recently published a polemical piece about 
Isabel by Marques de Morais that he had already posted on his blog:  
 
Through her father’s presidential decrees, Isabel built her fortune. Now, ironically, the man her father 
personally chose to replace him is first and foremost taking away the family’s fortunes that are tied with the 
state, thus recapturing it from their hands. […] 
Isabel dos Santos’ insatiable greed to devour Angola’s political economy was only matched by her own 
arrogance that the country was hers for the taking. […] During her daddy’s reign, Isabel dos Santos used 
UNITEL as her piggy bank. Without the Angolan cash cows, Isabel’s empire in Portugal, where she parked 
much of her international investments, will also become unsustainable (Marques de Morais 2018). 
 
 The Portuguese media has also extensively reported on Isabel, especially since the 
period of the economic crisis when she acquired extensive shares in Portugal’s multimedia, 
energy, real estate, and banking sectors (Fernandes 2015; Visão 2016; Siun et al. 2017). 
An exploratory search online produced hundreds of articles mentioning Isabel, from niche 
journals (e.g. Jornal de Negócios, Jornal Económico) to more mainstream newspapers (e.g. 
Público, Diário de Notícias, Jornal de Notícias, Expresso, Visão, Observador). As a result 
of her increasing interests in Portugal and other investments by Angolans, some articles 
suggested that the relationship between Angola and Portugal had been reversed: the former 
colonizer (Portugal) was now depicted as being colonized (by Angola) (Onishi 2017).  
 In addition, like many other news outlets, the cover of the weekly magazine Visão 
condemned the repressive nature of the regime when the rapper Luaty Beirão and 16 other 
activists were detained in 2015 on trumped up charges of attempting a coup.18  The journal 
later caricatured the fall of the Dos Santos family with the headline: “Angola: The Hunt of 
the Untouchables”.19  The headline of the weekly newspaper Expresso reflects the tone of 
more recent portrayals when it declares: “The New Owners of Angola: Who are the close 
confidantes of João Lourenço, the man who is destroying what is left of the previous 
power?”20  In addition, when an investigative report broadcast by the private television 
company, SIC (which belongs to the media group that also includes Expresso— and until 
recently—Visão21) also criticized the Dos Santos era, Isabel intervened personally to 
suspend its transmission in Angola. She argued that she was not retaliating against the 
station; she was only defending her business interests (Novo Jornal de Angola 2017b). 
Isabel has aggressively tried to offset the negative portrayals she gets in the news. 
She has embraced social media and started using Instagram, Facebook and Twitter more 
systematically to brand her image and defend herself. Through these outlets, ordinary 
people and the mainstream media have had increased, but highly controlled, access to her 
private and personal sphere in the last five years (Galrão 2016). As of Februrary 2019, she 
                                                        
18 See cover here: <http://visao.sapo.pt/revistas/2015-10-28-Edicao-1182>.  
19 See cover here: <http://visao.sapo.pt/revistas/2018-09-26-Edicao-1334>. 
20 See front page here: <https://expresso.sapo.pt/Capas/2018-09-28-A-primeira-pagina-do-
Expresso#gs.udRFLRI>.  
21 Impresa media group: <http://www.impresa.pt/apresentacao-grupo>. 
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had over 131,000 followers on Instagram, 30,400 followers on Twitter, and 237,000 
followers on Facebook. Her posts mix together photos celebrating food, culture, hotspots, 
flora and fauna of Angola, family photos and selfies, but also they contain inspirational 
sayings about women and children, or being a good business leader. Her personal webpage, 
“Sharing by Isabel dos Santos,” begun in 2018, spins a narrative around her as a woman 
and an entrepreneur that is meant to inspire others. She gives advice on leadership, 
development in Africa, how to start a business, and how African women should empower 
themselves in the business world.22 Here she defines herself simply by saying: “If I had to 
summarize who I am in a few words I would say that I am: Angolan, woman, mother, 
business woman, and entrepreneur.”23 
 Similar to other global celebrities, she also uses social media to engage with the 
public, create controversy, react to criticism, and challenge what she perceives as “fake 
news.”  In 2016, as perhaps any jet lagged passenger might do, Isabel posted pictures of 
herself on Instagram looking hot and tired when she experienced a half-hour delay at the 
Lisbon airport. 4,000 followers “liked” the post and 621 people commented on an article 
about it. More recently, following her dismissal from Sonangol, and the launch of an 
investigation by Angolan authorities into potential graft and illicit financial transfers during 
her tenure there, she used tweets to send ironic messages to current President João 
Lourenço. She also got involved in a heated discussion with the activist and rapper Luaty 
Beirão after he tweeted, “Hey, sista with a gr8 mind, how does it feel being sacked? You 
ought to get used to it now @isabelaangola?” (Diário de Notícias 2017). Isabel then created 
a webpage to tell “her truth” and to present “facts” that contradicted the accusations of bad 
management.24 Social media can be valuable tools in Isabel’s endeavors to fashion herself, 
as it seems she can no longer count on the support of state-led media (Novo Jornal de 
Angola 2017a). However, her sometimes careless use of Instagram and Twitter and the 
resulting over-exposure have made her more vulnerable to direct and immediate reactions 
from regime critics.  
 Although we have so far been focusing on Isabel, it is important to note that the 
negative portrayals have targeted not only Isabel, but also several members of the Dos 
Santos family. Searches on the state owned Jornal de Angola’s editorial page “A palavra 
do Director” reveal a shift in the patterns of support: 17 out of the 39 editorial articles 
published between 7 January and 14 October 2018, convey veiled criticisms of the Dos 
Santos family and their protégés, while praising João Lourenço and the inauguration of a 
new political cycle. For example, a particularly damning extract from an editorial titled 
“Sopranos” states: 
 
In pursuit of the primitive accumulation of capital, a minority took advantage of public goods for their own 
personal benefit. In several ways, this minority now struggles against a campaign carried out by newly elected 
officials to improve public morals and fight against corruption and a culture of impunity. This minority thinks 
that it can stand above everything and everyone, that it can do everything regardless of the means used. As 
one renowned prosecutor said, they are without fear because they believe that the law is for others and a dead 
letter for their insatiable appetites (Jornal de Angola 2018).  
 
                                                        
22 <https://isabeldossantos.com/>, accessed October 23, 2018. 
23 Ibid. 
24 <http://www.factos-sonangol.com/>, accessed October 23, 2018. 
 13 
Given that the title of the article references an American television series about a family 
connected to the mafia and the extract alludes to illegal and immoral tactics allegedly used 
by a “minority” in Angola, the implication is obvious. The minority is being compared to 
the mafia. 
 
 
Explaining the Obsession with Isabel 
 
In many ways the attention paid by the media to Isabel is no different from People 
magazine following movie stars, or telling us which designer is preferred by the former 
first lady of the US  Michelle Obama. It is no different from coverage of other wealthy sons 
and daughters of African presidents—or American presidents for that matter. Moreover, 
for every Isabel dos Santos, there are hundreds of big men and sons of big men who gain 
notoriety for their corporate acquisitions or extravagant spending habits (Olingo 2014). 
Figures such as former President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, former President Guebuza in 
Mozambique, former President Zuma in South Africa or Teodorin Obiang Mangue, the son 
of President Obiang of Equatorial Guinea and current first vice-president, have allegedly 
amassed their wealth through gatekeeper politics, that is, they have used their political 
positions to participate in lucrative business deals, to acquire shares in companies, to 
receive kickbacks that enrich themselves and their supporters. Yet, the high quantity and 
sheer vitriol of articles about Isabel over the last five years requires explanation. 
 We offer several arguments to explain why Isabel is the focus of so much attention 
by journalists and readers. The first is that contrasting representations of Isabel in print and 
on social media call attention to competing discourses regarding economic conditions and 
the economic “rules of the game” in Angola. Indeed, the national and foreign accolades 
awarded to Isabel owing to her wealth, influence, and commercial acumen combined with 
Isabel’s efforts to brand herself as an entrepreneur and business woman help to legitimate 
the adoption of market driven policies in Angola over the last two decades. By rewarding 
Isabel’s entrepreneurship, the domestic and foreign media sanction the shift to the market 
and private property rights, and the individual accumulation that accompanies such shifts. 
By noting Isabel’s investments in telecommunications in Angola or banking in Portugal, 
the media narrative seeks to normalize such business transactions in a country that 
previously proclaimed its adherence to Marxism-Leninism at independence.  
 An editorial in the state-run Jornal de Angola is a case in point. Commenting on 
Isabel’s inclusion on the Forbes list, the editors stated in 2013, “As we do our best for an 
Angola without poverty, we commemorate the fact that Isabel is a reference for world 
finance. This is good for Angola and the Angolans are proud. After all, our golden dream 
is that all human beings be rich, in whatever part of the planet” (quoted in Louçã & Ash 
2018: 96). By treating wealth accumulation as a virtue, this statement seeks to overturn 
previous official denunciations of global corporate capital and to instantiate new values 
within Angolan society. 
 Yet, as Isabel has gained international visibility she also has become a target of 
criticism, particularly by the Portuguese media and participants on social media. American 
and European news outlets have also aired suspicions regarding the origins and merits of 
her wealth, while also acknowledging her style and beauty (Soares de Oliveira 2014; 
Fernandes 2015). The negative depictions of Isabel by journalists or critical comments by 
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readers on social media reflect disapproval of the means by which wealth has been 
accumulated and capitalism has been constructed in post-war, post-socialist Angola. For 
example, critics often draw contrasts between the extent of Isabel’s wealth, and the fact 
that a majority of Angolans live on $2 a day (Dolan & Marques Morais 2013; Caminada 
2017). They also highlight the frequent participation of Sonangol and powerful generals in 
some of her businesses or the lack of transparency of many of her investments.  In doing 
so, they call attention to shady business practices in the country, and favoritism. Even 
business journals frequently point out the role that political and family connections may 
have played in her wealth accumulation, although she still receives invitations to speak at 
business events. Besides emphasizing the privileges enjoyed by the elite and the unfair 
advantages enjoyed by those with connections, many of those who respond to her posts on 
social media often notice the contrast between Isabel’s wealth and that of ordinary 
Angolans. As one women commented when Isabel complained about having to wait at the 
Lisbon airport: “In a country in which she is a woman with the most money and her father 
is the president, there are children waiting a lifetime for a meal, a school, a doctor, a decent 
house and for their parents to have freedom” (Jornal de Notícias 2017). 
 For many critics, Isabel personifies widespread corruption in the country, the 
accumulation of wealth outside of the law by elite Angolans, the disappearance of billions 
of petrodollars into the pockets of the powerful, the reliance on personal contacts to get 
ahead, and the common practice of stashing finances in off-shore accounts. That she is a 
glamorous “femocrat” (Mama 1995: 41), that is, a prominent woman who owes her power 
to her connection to her father, the former president, seems to intensify the rage. Women 
in Angola may run small businesses as Isabel herself has acknowledged, but few women 
head parastatals or run large companies (Siun et al. 2017). Besides Isabel, no other Angolan 
woman seems to be on the list of multimillionaires and billionaires in the country. Whereas 
some analysts like Carlos Rosado de Carvalho, economist and the director of Expansão, a 
weekly financial newspaper in Angola, make it clear that the recent removal of Dos Santos 
family members from prominent positions is about enhancing the morality of economic 
life in Angola (Rosado de Carvalho 2017) and not a vendetta against the Dos Santos family; 
others like Rafael Marques de Morais (2012, 2018) view Isabel and other billionaires like 
General Leopoldino do Nascimento and General Manuel Vieira Dias as representative of 
the kind of crony capitalism that has been institutionalized in Angola.  Angola’s economy 
is so intertwined with the Dos Santos clan and their affiliates that it is not easy to see how 
it can be morally cleansed.  
 The second interpretation explores the temporal representations of Isabel. We argue 
that the change over time—from celebratory depictions of Isabel and her family to reports 
on investigations of irregularities under her directorship of Sonangol—by the state-
controlled media illustrate the potential limits of dynastic politics in cases where ruling 
parties are powerful. Moments of dynastic succession are often periods when differences 
escalate within the national elite, the leading families or clans, and the ruling party, 
particularly in authoritarian cases. Understanding instances when dynastic succession is 
expected, but does not occur, can provide additional insight into the mechanisms by which 
dynasties survive and decline. The study of political dynasties, or the familial transmission 
of political power, has a long tradition in the social sciences and includes case studies 
spanning all continents (Brossier & Dorronsoro 2016: 10-11). In Africa, autocratic regimes 
such as Togo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Uganda as well as more democratic countries 
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often receive media and scholarly attention (Handy 2005; Bernault & Tonda 2009; Yates 
2017). One interesting case of politics as a family business is Benin, where Rosine Soglo 
founded a party (Renaissance du Béni—RB) to help her husband Nicéphore Soglo win the 
presidential race (Tozo 2004).  
 What distinguishes Angola from most of these cases is that following his decision 
to depart, there was no transmission of political power from JES to any of his children, nor 
did the “official” first lady assume a prominent political role in the family political 
enterprise as was the case of Simone Gbagbo in the Ivory Coast (Touré 2004). JES would 
have preferred a dynastic succession, according to some scholars, but he never took the 
necessary steps (Dias 2017). His first choice, José Filomeno dos Santos was not prepared 
or trained to be president, while Manuel Vicente—his second choice—faced dissent within 
the party (Pearce et al. 2018: 149). Like José Filomeno dos Santos, Isabel was often floated 
by the media as possible successor but she never invested enough in her political career 
nor did she demonstrate a clear interest in following in her dad’s footsteps (Rosa 2016). 
When asked about her political ambitions she stated:  
 
My real passion is to be an entrepreneur, I love building something new, waking up in the morning and 
having an idea, gathering the right team around me in order to challenge me [...]. I believe there are many 
ways to solve Africa's problems: creating jobs, creating opportunities, creating business is as good a way as 
politics (Gomes 2017). 
 
 Perhaps individual decisions by members of the Dos Santos family explain their 
inability or unwillingness to retain political power, but it is also likely that the ruling MPLA 
party thwarted opportunities for family members to succeed their father. Isabel’s position 
as a person of mixed race (mestiça) may have been one of the strikes against her. According 
to Fernandes (2015: 32-33), citing Catarina Antunes Gomes, one of the reasons that JES 
was chosen to be president instead of Lucio Lara after the death of Agostinho Neto in 1979 
was because JES was black whereas Lara was mixed race. Since the majority of the 
population was African, the party did not think it was appropriate for Lara to take the helm 
(ibid.). In turn, when the question of a successor to JES arose, at least one analyst indicated 
that owing to the “racial politics” of Angola, the party would not choose Isabel. “She is 
mestiça and that immediately constitutes a barrier difficult to overcome” (Vines quoted in 
VOA 2016). Support for this claim is provided by several articles and comments on social 
media that suggest there is widespread resentment against mestiços, not only because of 
their perceived privileges, but also because of their alleged racism. Although discussions 
of race may still be taboo in Angola, racist statements and accusations of racism have begun 
to surface since the domestic media began to condemn Isabel.25   
 Another important consideration is that like the Frelimo party in Mozambique, the 
MPLA derives its political power and organizational coherence from its origins as an armed, 
anti-colonial liberation movement; a high degree of hierarchy and centralization during the 
period when it was a one party state; and its dependence on, and inclusion of, military 
                                                        
25 See the comments in response to the following article, “Isabel dos Santos nega possibilidade de vender 
participação na GALP à Sonangol,” Angonotícias, October 23, 2018, 
<http://www.angonoticias.com/Artigos/item/59385/isabel-dos-santos-nega-possibilidade-de-vender-
participacao-na-galp-a-sonangol>, accessed January 23, 2019.  See also Isabel’s response to charges of 
racism in footnote 1 supra. Among others, R. MARQUES DE MORAIS (2016) has written about the racism 
towards Mozambicans and Angolans by Portuguese nationals. 
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officers during the long period of armed struggle both before and after independence. 
Owing to the long period of civil conflict between the MPLA and the opposition movement, 
Unita, after independence, the government has had to rely heavily on the military and the 
ruling party has included many officers as members. As a party, the MPLA also has 
investments in several sectors of the economy.  
 Together these reasons may explain why party members were reluctant to see the 
continued accumulation of power and wealth in the hands of the Dos Santos family (see 
also Pearce et al. 2018). According to one Angolan analyst (Soren Kirk Jensen in Africa 
Center for Strategic Studies 2017): “There are indications that the old guard and real 
powerbrokers had grown increasingly weary of appointments of family members to key 
political positions (...) and moved to block their further political rise.” Now that Isabel is 
under investigation and her brother, José Filomeno dos Santos, is still in protective custody 
(as of Februrary 2019), it would appear that the MPLA party has re-asserted itself (Jornal 
de Angola, 2019).  
 In addition, the critical coverage of Isabel by domestic media since 2017 reflects a 
power struggle within the Angolan elite over control of the country’s most lucrative 
resources. Along with that of her brother, Isabel’s swift downfall calls attention to the 
consolidation of power by João Lourenço and the cultivation of a new set of domestic elites 
ready to serve his interests (Coroado et al. 2018). Close allies of JES such as Norberto 
Garcia, a spokesman for the MPLA, and Valter Filipe da Silva, formerly head of the Bank 
of Angola, are currently facing corruption charges. Moreover, the fact that Isabel’s 
replacement as head of Sonangol is Carlos Saturnino, a man who had previously been fired 
by her father, suggests that President Lourenço is constructing a coterie of followers linked 
by their dislike of former President Dos Santos. Others such as Manuel Vicente, the former 
of vice-president, have become close confidantes of the new president, likely because they 
are both politically compromised in some way and/or because their experience and insider 
knowledge is useful to Lourenço (Filipe 2018). The rest of the emerging coalition around 
Lourenço are party members who have voluntarily shifted their allegiances (Africa 
Confidential 2018). Whether the rejection of personalistic and dynastic politics represents 
a new direction for Angola is doubtful, however. As Pearce, Peclard and Soares de Oliveira 
(2018: 160) observe, the emerging coalition has “been socialized within the MPLA over 
more than 40 years, marked by the experience of war, centralized power and elite control 
of the political economy, about which they never expressed misgivings.”  
 As a final point, we argue that the tone and frequency of criticisms of Isabel convey 
deeply misogynistic positions regarding the presence of a powerful African female in big 
business ventures. A small contingent of Angolan journalists, a large percentage of the 
Western media, particularly in Portugal, and those who make comments on social media 
often deprecate and infantilize her, belittling her as an “African princess,” “Daddy’s girl”, 
or menina Belinha (little Bella) who basically depended on her father to get her wealth. 
One Italian journal referred to her as a “Black Goddess” (cited in Marques de Morais 2012). 
She has been described as “cold” as any woman who has stepped outside of the 
stereotypical female role must invariably be. She has been derided for flying in a choir 
from Belgium and planeloads of guests for her wedding (Smith 2013). 
 Misogyny does double duty in these characterizations. First, attacks against Isabel 
are a synecdoche for criticisms of an economy that is highly unequal. As Laura Mandell 
(1999: 1) writes: “In the wake of work by Mary Douglas, critics have shown that misogyny 
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in representations is not about women but rather about society: representations that inspire 
passionate hatred of women and disgust with the female body provide a place for people 
to work out passionate feelings about changes in economic and social structure.” 
 In this case, since the misogynous depiction concerns not a woman in literature (the 
focus of Mandell’s analysis), but a living woman, misogynous references to Isabel are not 
just expressions of disgust with Angola’s political economy. They also demonstrate 
resentment of her wealth, education, power, and cosmopolitanism. Outside of Angola, she 
challenges common and comfortable understandings of African women as oppressed, rural, 
and illiterate. Inside Angola, critics are suspicious of her Russian roots; her modern, 
Western, and iconic status. Implicit in these criticisms perhaps is longstanding disapproval 
of the subversion of traditional social hierarchies by a colonial regime that used women for 
their labor, including labor traditionally performed by men. 
 Moreover, embedded in the critiques is a gendered condemnation of the ruling 
MPLA’s emphasis on the emancipation of women (at least in the public sphere) which has 
echoes in the political divisions after independence. During the civil conflict, for example, 
the opposition movement Unita relied heavily on the rhetoric of “tradition,” “tribalism,” 
“heritage” and “chiefly control” as a recruitment tool to gain support from men in the initial 
years of the war.  As Scott points out, “Unita’s ideology [...] effectively taps into 
sentimental and romantic notions of African tribal life and women’s role within it” (Scott 
1994: 103). Moreover, because a private relationship between a father and daughter 
became instrumental to Isabel’s success in the public sphere, she has crossed the boundary 
that the ruling party itself drew between publicly affirming the liberation of women while 
ignoring the efforts by men to subordinate women in the family and the household (Scott 
1994: 99). Isabel’s apparent transgression of what is considered appropriate for women to 
do may explain why we did not see a transfer of political power to her.  
 Post-imperial patriarchal and racial resentment of her wealth and privilege by 
Portuguese men is also starkly evident in the media and in readers’ comments. Because 
Isabel and other Angolan elites are buying property or companies in Portugal, repetition  
of the distorted trope regarding reverse colonialism is common. Yet, were it not for 
Angolan investment in Portugal after the 2009 financial crisis, the effects of the housing 
crisis there likely would have been greater.  
 
 
 
Isabel is the ultimate femocrat. During the years her father was president, she was able to 
vastly increase her wealth and to garner stakes in key economic and financial sectors inside 
and outside Angola at a surprising speed. Observing Isabel’s trajectory is not enough to 
fully understand the transformation of the Angolan economy in the post-war, post-socialist 
period, but it is, nevertheless, illustrative of a larger phenomenon: the promotion by the 
ruling party of primitive forms of resource accumulation by an oligarchic elite. As a major 
beneficiary of this form of crony capitalism, Isabel, like other femocrats, is complicit with 
the “patriarchal status quo” that has been the main source of her wealth. Her position as a 
woman and wealthy entrepreneur in a highly unequal society is controversial and 
contradictory, and has generated strong criticism in the national and international media, 
particularly since power transferred from JES to João Lourenço.   
 In the preceding pages, we tried to document and explain how the different features 
of Isabel’s femocracy are represented in the national and international media over time. 
 18 
Our analysis revealed that negative depictions of Isabel accelerated after her father left 
power. This was observed not only in state-led national media, but also in international 
media, particularly the Portuguese media. We have argued that attacks on her mainly 
represent an indictment of the kind of state capitalism that exists in Angola. They challenge 
the unequal distribution of privilege, power and wealth in Angola. Her status as the richest 
women in Africa is perceived as an affront to the quality of life of the average Angolan 
citizen, particularly women.  
 Isabel is not the first woman to betray other women by privileging her access to 
capital and to powerful men over solidarity with other women. But given the post-war 
context, the dependence on oil, the diverse investments abroad and the longevity of her 
father’s rule, her betrayal of ordinary Angolan women is particularly egregious. Via her 
Facebook and Twitter, she recently publicized that she attended the United Nations debate 
on equal rights for women, but she is not like most ordinary women and they might find it 
difficult to identify with her. The opportunities she has had from the outset to grow and 
prosper are not equally available to others. At most, what she has received is only 
comparable to other (African) women who are either spouses or daughters of wealthy 
presidents. 
 Although most of the negative portrayals of Isabel have to do with way she has 
accumulated her wealth, highly gendered critiques of her abound in articles, in comments 
and in posts on social media. Their negative and derogatory tone reflect the persistence of 
misogynistic attitudes towards women not only in Angola but also in Portugal. Although 
attacks against Isabel should in no way overshadow the gains that women have made in 
these two countries, they do indicate that unlike men, women, even powerful women, 
continue to confront significant barriers to equal treatment. 
 At the same time, Isabel’s rise and fall provides a window into the changing nature 
of the elite coalition that now governs Angola. With the succession of João Lourenço into 
the leadership, the Angolan government and the ruling party are re-setting. Partly 
performance and partly power struggle, the attacks against Isabel suggest a settling of 
scores and a changing of the guard, although we should not expect to see a radical 
restructuring of the way that business is done in Angola. State capitalism will structure 
economic relationships for the foreseeable future, but the participants in those relationships 
will be different.  
 Finally, the present study offers important contributions beyond Isabel and the 
Angolan case. It illuminates the processes of oligarchic elite political formation and 
exposes the limits to wealth accumulation in an authoritarian regime. Second, it 
demonstrates how an institutionalized and strong political party can offset attempts at 
dynastic succession even by a seemingly entrenched leader. Lastly, it shows that powerful 
women in Africa face not only legitimate criticism for their actions but also ridicule and 
vilification because of their gender. Despite the many gains made by women on the African 
continent since independence, such treatment suggests that women have failed to dislodge 
deep seated attachments to male dominance. 
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